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Volunteer computing uses Internet-connected devices (laptops, PCs, smart devices,etc.), in which their owners
volunteer them as storage and computing power resources, has become an essential mechanism for resource
management in numerous applications. The growth of the volume and variety of data traffic in the Internet
leads to concerns on the robustness of cyberphysical systems especially for critical infrastructures. Therefore,
the implementation of an efficient Intrusion Detection System for gathering such sensory data has gained
vital importance. In this paper, we present a comparative study of Artificial Intelligence (AI)-driven intrusion
detection systems for wirelessly connected sensors that track crucial applications. Specifically, we present
an in-depth analysis of the use of machine learning, deep learning and reinforcement learning solutions to
recognize intrusive behavior in the collected traffic. We evaluate the proposed mechanisms by using KDD’99 as
real attack data-set in our simulations. Results present the performance metrics for three different IDSs namely
the Adaptively Supervised and Clustered Hybrid IDS (ASCH-IDS), Restricted Boltzmann Machine-based
Clustered IDS (RBC-IDS) and Q-learning based IDS (QL-IDS) to detect malicious behaviors. We also present
the performance of different reinforcement learning techniques such as State-Action-Reward-State-Action
Learning (SARSA) and the Temporal Difference learning (TD). Through simulations, we show that QL-IDS
performs with 100% detection rate while SARSA-IDS and TD-IDS perform at the order of 99.5%.
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lations; Network performance analysis;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Smart cities exploit the flexibility, self-deployment and low-cost benefits of wireless sensors to
monitor their critical infrastructures [1]. Monitoring critical infrastructures involves various types of
sensors under different circumstances [2][3]. Efficiency and reliability of critical infrastructures such
as medical infrastructure can be met by using reliable and secure data aggregation and transmission
[4] [5]. Sensors and the communication lines between them are vulnerable to numerous intruders
that may interrupt and manipulate with the communication and transmitted data [6][7]. IDS is an
essential component for network security to detect different types of intrusions. At the very high
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conclusion in Section 7.
proposed IDS. Experimental and results analysis are presented in section 6. Finally, we present the 
4 introduces the IDS topology settings. Section 5 describes the methods used to test the previously 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 layouts this study’s related works. Section 
raise an alarm with the detection of any malicious node that exhibits intrusive behavior [8].
types of intrusions. At the very high level, the validity of any IDS is determined by its ability to 
essential component for network security especially for the sensor networks to detect different 
reliable and secure data aggregation and transmission [4]. Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is an 
data. WSNs need to provide an acceptable level of security to achieve attacks free environments, 
numerous intruders that may interrupt and manipulate with the communication and transmitted 
which can manipulate the aggregated sensory data. The communication lines are also vulnerable to 
are deployed in an open nature environment, thus, nodes could be vulnerable to different attacks 
tures involve numerous sensors under various phenomena. In most of critical infrastructures, WSNs 
cesses, due to their self-deployment, flexibility and low-cost benefits. Monitoring critical infrastruc- 
WSNs are major technology in critical infrastructures, especially in monitoring and control pro- 
2 MOTIVATIONS
  machine, deep and reinforcement learning methods.
(3) For the first time, we present a comprehensive and comparative study of IDS evaluation using
  performance.
  learning, SARSA learning and TD learning methods are introduced to estimate the IDS
(2) It presents an intrusion detection mechanism, in which reinforcement learning using Q-
  to the distributed data and evaluating the IDS performance.
(1) This work directly target the volunteer computing by applying the previously proposed IDSs
proposed IDS. The main contributions of this work are mentioned as follows.
Q-learning, SARSA-learning and TD-learning based reinforcement procedures to our previously 
learning approaches (Q-learning). We also develop our work presented in [6][8][7] by introducing 
(random forest and E-DBSCAN), deep learning (restricted Boltzmann machine) and reinforcement 
of intrusion detection in critical infrastructures which compares the usage of machine learning 
IDS by following an adaptive supervision procedure. In this paper, we provide a comparative study 
following aim in common: signature detection and anomaly detection which can be combined in an 
IDS methods for WSNs monitoring critical infrastructures [8][7]. All of these approaches have the 
unknown attack [6][8]. In our previous work, we proposed several artificial intelligence (AI)-based 
of solely adopting a signature-based IDS is that its possible low precision in the likelihood of an 
intrusive event is detected when the noticed activities match a known malicious pattern. The risk 
mechanism to detect malicious behavior by comparing system activities with specific rules. An 
an intrusive event [6]. Apart from the anomaly-based IDS, signature IDSs uses the rule complement 
systems still suffer from False Positive (FP) decisions, i.e., a non-malicious activity’s being marked as 
Anomaly-based IDSs are able to detect unknown attacks. However, It is worth noting that most IDS 
variance between the extracted patterns and noticed activities may lead to an alarm. Thus, ideally 
the normal behavior. To this end, it creates profiles of the features to seize the needed patterns. The 
IDS and Signature-based IDS. The former aims to detect abnormal traffic patterns that deviate from 
malicious node that exhibits intrusive behavior [8]. IDSs are categorized in two sets: Anomaly-based 
level, the validity of any IDS is determined by its ability of raising an alarm with the detection of any 
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them to a central agent. Agents that are higher in the hierarchy are equipped with the knowledge for
learning approach in which each agent (i.e. sensor) analyzes state observations and communicates 
applied into IDSs by several studies. In [26], the researchers proposed a distributed reinforcement 
that take actions to maximize the notion of rewards. Previously, reinforcement learning process was 
Reinforcement learning (RL) considered as an extension to machine learning, and involves agents 
3.3 Reinforcement learning based IDS
computationally and storage tasks to the cloud to benefit of the edge computing capabilities.
along with the enhancements in the large-scale machine learning area for moving the highest 
in fog-to-things computing. The work in [25] proved the flexibility of cloud-based infrastructures 
[24] and [25]. In [24], the authors proposed a cyber-attack detection deep learning-based mechanism 
  Deep learning has been introduced to the distributed computing such as the works presented in 
the features for a DBN to classify anomalous and normal behavior patterns.
applied an autoencoder in the first stage of an IDS in order to reduce dimensionality and extract 
  High dimensionality is a grand challenge in big data applications; hence the authors in [23]
anomaly detection as an energy-based classifier.
evolve dynamically. The authors applied Discriminative Restricted Boltzmann Machine (DRBM) to 
classifier was trained with normal traffic only so any knowledge about malicious behaviors could 
≈92% accuracy rate. Authors in [22] presented a partial supervised learning approach where the 
where DBN served as a feature selector and SVM as the classifier. The hybrid approach resulted in 
patterns. The authors in [18] combined DBN and SVMs, and introduced a hybrid IDS methodology 
In [21] the authors tested the abilities of a Deep Belief Network (DBN) in the detection of intrusive 
Deep learning methods have been applied to IDS and achieved highly accurate results [18][19][20]. 
3.2 Deep Learning-based IDS
anomaly and misuse detection subsystems.
adjustment technique for the proportion of the aggregated sensory data that forwarded to the 
both known and unknown intruders remains an open issue. In ASCH-IDS, we present a dynamic 
  To the best of our knowledge, an adaptive-IDS solution for critical infrastructures that deal with 
collection, as well as the generation and deployment of detection models.
in real time to perform IDSs. AMG enables evaluation of data in real time, and automates the data 
proposed an Adaptive Model Generation (AMG) as a model generator which would work adaptively 
validation procedure by presenting the automated and adaptive testing prototype. the work in [17]
the accuracy of classification such as the work presented in [16] where the researchers presented a 
  Adaptive machine learning-based techniques for IDS have been tested in many studies to improve 
hyperplanes and also automates feature selection.
Machines (SVM) have also been be considered [15], which partitions the data plane into smaller 
a centroid are K-nearest neighbour and K-means [14]. As a supervised approach, Support Vector 
behavior [13]. Popular machine learning algorithms that aim to cluster behavior patterns around 
The goal of any IDS is to identify two different behavior patterns: normal behavior and malicious 
3.1 Machine Learning-based IDS
behaviors [11][12].
based techniques had been used in IDSs and proved their effectiveness in detection intrusive 
tackled the unknown attacks [9] while others tackled the known ones [10]. Lately, deep learning 
Integration of machine learning with IDS have been proposed by many researchers. Some of them 
3 RELATED WORKS
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sensors’ trust scores with the estimated trust between sensors and the aggregator [32]. Equation
procedure. The method depends on assessing the trust score of the aggregator by tracking the 
presented in [32] has been adopted in our previous and ongoing research as the aggregation 
Each CH gathers data from its corresponding sensors and sends them to the sink. The method 
4.2 Data aggregation procedure
𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑠𝑢𝑚 and 𝜕𝑛, accordingly.
In Algorithm 1, 𝑛 refers to any node, 𝑔ℏ𝑛 , 𝑔𝑚 , 𝑔𝑠𝑢𝑚 and 𝑔𝑑 refer to the weight factors of ℏ𝑛 , 𝑀𝑛 , 
ℏ𝑛 refers to the cumulative time for node 𝑛, and 𝐺𝑛 represents the combined weight for node 𝑛. 
represents the sum of n’s received signal strength, 𝑀𝑛 represents the mobility factor for node 𝑛, 
the CH Capacity (i.e. number of nodes), 𝜕𝑛 refers to the degree difference for 𝑛, 𝑆𝑅𝑆𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ (𝑛)
goes through steps as shown in Algorithm 1 Where 𝐷𝑛 refers to the degree of node 𝑛, Γ represents 
to the node degree excluding CH capacity, cumulative time and 𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑠𝑢𝑚 . The election procedure 
  The weight depends on the following four elements: mobility and degree difference which refers 
node that achieves the lowest weight is elected as the CH [31] [8] [6].
(ID). It then proceeds to compare it with the weights of the neighbour nodes such as the sensor 
Following the weight computation, the node broadcasts its weight along with its unique identifier 
that is a function of its (𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑠𝑢𝑚) which refers to its received signal strength, mobility, and degree. 
sensor node and compares it to the weights of the other nodes [31]. Each node has a weight 𝐺𝑛 
CH election method is fulfilled by using the election technique that calculates the weight of each 
A Cluster-Head (CH) election method has been adopted for data collection and processing reasons. 
4.1 Weighted Cluster Head (CH) selection
all-through the manuscript are enlisted in Table 1.
4.1, 2) Data aggregation in Section 4.2, 3) The detection methods in Section 5. The notations used 
the intrusion detection method. The IDS consists of : 1) Weighted cluster head selection in Section 
the IDS which is installed in a central node namely the server. The aggregated data then undergoes 
the responsibility of the Cluster Head (CH) which collects the data from sensors and directs it to 
  The IDS consists of 𝑁 clusters with 𝐶 sensors in each cluster. Aggregating the sensory data is 
our previous work [6] to the volunteer computing architecture.
We adopt the IDS model that was proposed for WSN-based critical infrastructure monitoring in 
4 SYSTEM MODEL
open issue.
Learning (SARSA) and the Temporal Difference learning (TD) reinforcement learning remains an 
that works for both known and unknown attacks using Q-based, State-Action-Reward-State-Action 
  To this end, a comprehensive comparison/evaluation of IDS for critical monitoring infrastructures 
flooding-based Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks.
[30] exploits the use of data flow information, Reinforcement Learning and tile coding to detect 
new attacks autonomously with the use of reinforcement learning method. The work presented in 
in [29] presented an approach of an adaptive neural networks to intrusion detection that detect 
online clustering by using Pursuit Reinforcement Competitive Learning (PRCL). The researchers 
MRP value functions. The work presented in [28] proposed an approach to detect intrusion with 
behavior of system call series where the intrusion detection issue is transfigured to predict the 
through a series of system calls by presenting a Markovian reward process (MRP) to replicate the 
[26]. The authors in [27] presented reinforcement learning - based technique for host-based IDS 
analyzing the collected data, and they broadcast an overall abnormal state to the network operator 
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(1) computes the trust score of a CH [32] where 𝑇𝐶𝐻 denotes the CH trust value, 𝑇𝑛 is node 𝑛 trust
value, and 𝑇𝑛𝐶𝐻 is the CH and node 𝑛 trust estimation.
𝑇𝐶𝐻 =
(∑𝑛−1𝑛=0 (𝑇𝑛 + 1) ·𝑇𝑛𝐶𝐻 )∑𝑛−1
𝑛=0 (𝑇𝑛 + 1)
(1)
Algorithm 1:Weighted Cluster Head (CH) selection pseudo-code
1: procedureWeighted CH selection
2: Input: 𝐷𝑛 , Γ, |1/𝑆𝑅𝑆𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ (𝑛) |,𝑀𝑛 , ℏ𝑛
3: Output: 𝐺𝑛
4: for each node 𝑛 do
𝜕𝑛 = |𝐷𝑛 − Γ |
5: |1/𝑆𝑅𝑆𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ (𝑛) |:normalized value of 𝑆𝑅𝑆𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ
6: 𝐺𝑛 = 𝑔𝑑 𝜕𝑛 + 𝑔𝑠𝑢𝑚|1/𝑆𝑅𝑆𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ (𝑛) | + 𝑔𝑚𝑀𝑛 + 𝑔ℏ𝑛ℏ𝑛
7: EndFor
8: Return 𝐺𝑛
9: Select the node with a minimum 𝐺𝑛 as CH
10: Remove CH from the nodes list
11: Repeat all steps for the remaining nodes
12: End
13: end procedure
  data-set turn into the training data-set for the developing tree.
• If the training set size denoted by 𝑌 , a randomly extracted data-points 𝑦 from the original
When random forest is used for misuse detection, each tree is developed as described below [37]:
sensors.
contains 𝑁 clusters where the CH handles the aggregation procedure of the data forwarded by the 
  Fig. 2 represents the previously proposed CHH-IDS[6] where CHH-IDS runs on a WSN which 
fashion following a time-slotted method as shown in Fig. 1.
stages [37]. In [6], the collected data is partitioned into IDS subsystems (IDSs) in a round-robin 
delivers a vote if it happened [36], it operates in two stages: the training and the classification 
as a classification mechanism in which each tree checks each input for the frequent classes and 
variance with considering its e-neighbourhood [35]. On the other hand, when random forest used 
the track of the variation of local density in the cluster and computes any core objects’ density 
distributed into areas of objects with low densities [34] while the E-DBSCAN algorithm retains 
clustering method where clusters are considered as dense areas of objects where the data space is 
with Noise while 𝑀𝐷𝑆𝑠 follows the random forest technique. DBSCAN returns to a density based 
DBSCAN algorithm which refers to the Enhanced-Density Based Spatial Clustering of Applications 
hybrid system as shown in Algorithm 2 for detecting intrusive sensors. 𝐴𝐷𝑆𝑠 follows the E- 
Detection Subsystem (𝐴𝐷𝑆𝑠) and Misuse Detection Subsystem (𝑀𝐷𝑆𝑠). This translates into a 
two machine learning based subsystems working in parallel for intrusion detection: Anomaly 
In our previously proposed ASCH-IDS [7] and CHH-IDS [6], the collected sensed data experiences 
  Hybrid Intrusion Detection System (ASCH-IDS)
5.1 Adaptive Machine learning based the Adaptively Supervised and Clustered
5 INTRUSION DETECTION METHODS
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Table 1. Notations used in the manuscript
Notation Description
𝑉 Visible element
𝐻 Hidden element
𝑂 Outputs
𝑋 Number of visible nodes
𝑌 Number of hidden nodes
𝑎𝑥 Visible bias
𝑏𝑦 Hidden bias
𝑊 The weights between visible and hidden layers
𝑊𝑥𝑦 Combined weights of visible 𝑉𝑥 and hidden 𝐻𝑦 units
Θ RBM parameters (𝑊𝑥𝑦 ,𝑎𝑥 ,𝑏𝑦)
𝐸 (𝑉 ,𝐻 |Θ) The energy function of the RBM
𝑃 (𝑉 ,𝐻 ) The probability of (𝑉 ,𝐻 ) formation∑
𝑋,𝑌 𝑒
−𝐸 (𝑉 ,𝐻 ) The normalization factor (all possible configurations including the visible
and hidden elements)
𝑃 (𝑉 ) The probability allocated to any visible element 𝑉 , The network sets prob-
ability score to each case in hidden and visible elements[19][33]
𝑃 (𝐻 ) The probability allocated to any hidden element 𝐻
𝑃 (𝑉 |𝐻 ) The probability of 𝑉 independently with 𝐻
𝑃 (𝐻 |𝑉 ) The probability of 𝐻 independently with 𝑉
𝑃 (𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒) The binary output for intrusive detection
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 The binary output for normal detection
𝑟𝑒𝑐 Number of records
𝑉𝑎𝑟 Number of variables
𝑇𝑟 Number of trees
𝑇𝑃 True Positive
𝑇𝑁 True Negative
𝐹𝑃 False Positive
𝐹𝑁 False Negative
𝑆𝑡 State at time 𝑡
𝐴𝑡 Action at time 𝑡
𝑅𝑡 Reward at time 𝑡
𝑉 𝜋 (𝑆) Value estimation of 𝑅 that at initial state 𝑆
𝜋 (𝑆,𝐴) Probability of 𝐴 in 𝑆
𝑃𝑆𝑆+ (𝐴) Transitional probability from state 𝑆 to 𝑆+ at 𝐴
𝑅(𝑆, 𝑆+, 𝐴) Reward returned from transition from state 𝑆 to 𝑆+ at 𝐴
𝑟 Discount factor weight from future rewards to current rewards
𝑉 𝜋𝐼 (𝑆+) Value estimation of 𝑅 at state 𝑆+ at the initial iteration 𝐼
𝑉 𝜋𝐼+1 (𝑆) Value estimation of 𝑅 at state 𝑆 at the updated iteration 𝐼 + 1
𝑇𝐶𝐻 CH trust value
𝑇𝑛 Node 𝑛 trust value
𝑇𝑛𝐶𝐻 CH and node 𝑛 trust estimation
𝛼 The weight of the recently calculated𝑇𝑃/𝐹𝑃 and its value during the (△𝜏)
  developed to the most size.
  to split the node. 𝑥 considered as a constant while the forest develop where each tree is
• If the input variables denoted by 𝑋 , a randomly extracted data-points 𝑥 from 𝑋 can be utilized
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Fig. 1. Aggregated sensed data distribution mechanism between the IDSs1 and IDSs2.
On the other hand, E-DBSCAN used as clustering algorithm which has been utilized to extract
the 𝜖 which represents the distance threshold, 𝜖 is a critical factor in E-DBSCAN algorithm [38].
DBSCAN can realize the adjacent clusters which belong to the same density as well as clusters of
random shapes [39]. DBSCAN consists of two factors, the 𝜖 and the𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑃𝑡𝑠 which considered as
input parameters. It follows the rules descried below:
• 𝑁𝜖 (𝑥) = 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 |𝑑 (𝑥,𝑦) | ≤ 𝜖 is the 𝜖 − 𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 of point 𝑥 .
• Neighbourhoods of core object has a size > 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑃𝑡𝑠 .
• A point 𝑗 is density accessible from 𝑖 as a core object.
• 𝑖 and 𝑗 considered as density-based connected when 𝑖 and 𝑗 are density accessible from a
core object.
On the other hand, the ASCH-IDS [6] retains the track of 𝐴𝐷𝑆𝑠 and 𝑀𝐷𝑆𝑠 deviations in the
Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) and changes the segment of data directed to them
adaptively .
Equations. (2)-(3) represent the (𝑇𝑃) to (𝐹𝑃) for the two subsystems at 𝜏𝑖 which are represented
by 𝜇1 (𝜏𝑖 ) and 𝜇2 (𝜏𝑖 ) [7].
Algorithm 2: Detection of intrusive sensors
1: procedure Intrusive sensors detection
2: Cluster Head (CH) selection:Weighted CH selection
3: Data aggregation: Trust-based aggregation of sensed data
4: Data distribution: Aggregated data distribution between the two sub-systems
5: if (Intrusive behavior detected) then
ALARM
6:7 END
8: else
if (End of sensing data) then
END
9:10 else
Go to Data distribution
11:2 end procedure
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Fig. 2. CHH-IDS system model. The collected sensed data is distributed between the ADSs and MDSs.
𝜇1 (𝜏𝑖 ) = 𝑇𝑃1 (𝜏𝑖 )
𝐹𝑃1 (𝜏𝑖 ) (2)
𝜇2 (𝜏𝑖 ) = 𝑇𝑃2 (𝜏𝑖 )
𝐹𝑃2 (𝜏𝑖 ) (3)
Equations (4)-(5) represent the 𝑇𝑃 to 𝐹𝑃 ratios at time (△𝜏) where △𝜏=𝜏𝑖+1 − 𝜏𝑖 [7].
𝜇1 (△𝜏) = 𝑇𝑃1 (△𝜏)
𝐹𝑃1 (△𝜏) (4)
𝜇2 (△𝜏) = 𝑇𝑃2 (△𝜏)
𝐹𝑃2 (△𝜏) (5)
When the ROC behavior during △𝜏 is extracted, the ROC behavior of each subsystem can be
obtained as the sum of the ROC behavior at 𝜏 and the behavior at △𝜏 as represented in Eqs. (6) and
(7) [7]. where 𝛼 represents the weight of the recently calculated 𝑇𝑃/𝐹𝑃 and its value during the
(△𝜏) where 𝜏𝑖+1 = 𝜏𝑖 + △𝜏 .
𝜇1 (𝜏𝑖+1) = 𝛼𝜇1 (𝜏𝑖 ) + (1 − 𝛼)𝜇1 (△𝜏) (6)
𝜇2 (𝜏𝑖+1) = 𝛼𝜇2 (𝜏𝑖 ) + (1 − 𝛼)𝜇2 (△𝜏) (7)
Eq.(8) represents an indicator 𝐼 (𝜏𝑖 ) which tracks the ROC behavior of MDSs and ADSs at any
time 𝜏𝑖 .
𝐼 (𝜏𝑖 ) = 𝜇1 (𝜏𝑖 )
𝜇2 (𝜏𝑖 ) (8)
misuse (MDSs) at 𝜏𝑖 .
𝜇2 (𝜏𝑖 ), 𝐷𝑎 (𝜏𝑖 ) and 𝐷𝑚 (𝜏𝑖 ) refer to the segments of data forwarded to the anomaly (ADSs) and the 
(𝜏𝑖+1 − 𝜏𝑖 ) respectively. 𝛼 refers to the ROC characteristics weight in the evaluation of 𝜇1 (𝜏𝑖 ) and 
previous steps. Where 𝜏𝑖 ,𝜏𝑖+1 and △𝜏 refer to any time, 𝜏𝑖 + △𝜏 and the time difference between
△𝐷 denotes the data adjustment for each subsystem. Algorithm 3 presents an overview of the 
𝜇2 such as: 𝐷𝑎 (𝜏𝑖+1) = 𝐷𝑎 (𝜏𝑖 ) + △𝐷 and 𝐷𝑚 (𝜏𝑖+1) = 𝐷𝑚 (𝜏𝑖 ) − △𝐷 as formulated in (9)-(10) where 
wherever, if 𝐼 (𝜏𝑖+1) > 𝐼 (𝜏𝑖 ), the ASCH-IDS increases the data proportion on 𝜇1 and decreases on the data proportion on 𝑀𝐷𝑆𝑠 is expected to improvement of the overall performance of the system. 
the intrusion system determines that 𝑀𝐷𝑆𝑠 is performing better than 𝐴𝐷𝑆𝑠 , such as, any increase in 
proportion on 𝐴𝐷𝑆𝑠 is enhancing the overall performance of the system. variously, if 𝐼 (𝜏𝑖 ) < 𝐼 (𝜏𝑖−1), 
𝐼 (𝜏𝑖−1), ASCH-IDS decides that 𝐴𝐷𝑆𝑠 is performing better than 𝑀𝐷𝑆𝑠 . so, any increasing of data 
  The extracted indicator 𝐼 is used in the decision of directing the collected data such as if 𝐼 (𝜏𝑖 ) >
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  value of the total reward, starting from the current state.
• Different reinforcement learning techniques are called in order to maximize the expected
  updating the policies.
• The agent observes the environment for any changes and optimize the received rewards by
  refer to positive or negative rewards respectively.
• The environment supplies a reward 𝑅𝑡 for the actions performed in form of 𝑅+ or 𝑅− which
  the feedback from the environment.
• The agent interacts with the environment and takes actions 𝐴𝑡 in each state 𝑆𝑡 and observes
The fundamentals of reinforcement learning concept are as follows:
procedures. MDP come up with optimum policy to achieve the maximum rewards over time [40]. 
as many reinforcement learning algorithms such as Q-learning, employ dynamic programming 
In machine learning, the studied environment is defined as Markov Decision Process (MDP) which 
5.3 Reinforcement learning
same cluster and forwards them to the server by adopting the procedure in [32].
  In the RBC-IDS, each CH is responsible for aggregating the sensed data from the sensors in the 
layers and 𝑊23 is the weight between the second and the third hidden layers.
layer and the first hidden layer while 𝑊12 refers to the weight of the first and the second hidden 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 and 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 outputs respectively. 𝑊11 represents the weight between the first visible 
contains 𝑋 visible nodes, three hidden layers and output layer with two outputs 𝑂1 and 𝑂2 for 
  Fig. 3 represents the used RBM setting in RBC-IDS. The RBC-IDS consists of an input layer 
The network sets probability score to each case in hidden and visible elements[19][33].
Table 1 contains the RBM parameters used in Algorithm 4.
code in Algorithm 4.
neurons of the same layer, which makes it restricted, and the procedure is presented in the pseudo- 
procedure is steered by an unsupervised fashion [19]. The RBM permits connections between 
layers: (V) and (H) which refer to the visible and the hidden layers respectively, where the learning 
Restricted Boltzmann machine (RBM) is a neural, energetic network containing two types of 
  (RBC-IDS)
5.2 Deep learning based Restricted Boltzmann Machine-based Clustered IDS
by 𝑂 ((𝑇𝑟 ∗ 𝑉 𝑎𝑟 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑐 ∗ log(𝑉 𝑎𝑟 )) + (2 + (2𝑚)).
will be as 𝑂 (2 + (2𝑚)) = 𝑂 (𝑚). To this end, the overall complexity of the system can be calculated 
step is executed (𝑚 + 1) times, and the incremental step is executed (𝑚) times. Thus, the complexity 
is 𝑂 (𝑛)<(𝑛 ∗ log(𝑛)). In our E-DBSCAN, the initialization step is executed 1 time, the comparison query requests’ number. Since each point is operates with only one query, the run-time complexity 
number of variables. For E-DBSCAN as the second subsystem, the complexity is directed by the 
forest, the complexity is 𝑂 (𝑇𝑟 ∗ 𝑉 𝑎𝑟 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑐 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑉 𝑎𝑟 )) where 𝑇𝑟 is the number of trees, 𝑉 𝑎𝑟 is the 
tree with 𝑟 records and 𝑣 variables is 𝑂 (𝑣 + 𝑟𝑒𝑐 ∗ log(𝑣)) , while for multi trees as in our random 
can be extracted from decision tree, such as the complexity 𝐶 (𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑓 𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡) for building a decision algorithms complexities. Since the random Forest is a special model of decision trees, its complexity 
  As the proposed system consists of two subsystems, its complexity is a function of the two 
𝐷𝑚 (𝜏𝑖+1) = 𝐷𝑚 (𝜏𝑖 ) ± △𝐷 (10)
𝐷𝑎 (𝜏𝑖+1) = 𝐷𝑎 (𝜏𝑖 ) ± △𝐷 (9)
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5.3.1 Q-Learning. Q Learning builds on the concept of value iteration where the agent aims to
estimate the value function to update all states 𝑠 and actions 𝐴 every iteration in order to know
Algorithm 3: Adaptive IDS: (ASCH-IDS)
1: procedure ROC Tracking ⊲ Tracking the deviations in (ROC) of the anomaly and the misuse
detection subsystems
2: Input: 𝑇𝑃1 (𝜏0) , 𝐹𝑃1 (𝜏0) ,𝑇𝑃2 (𝜏0) , 𝐹𝑃2 (𝜏0)
3: Output: 𝜇1 (𝜏𝑖 ), 𝜇2 (𝜏𝑖 )
4: ⊲ 𝜇1 (𝜏𝑖 ): Ratio of 𝑇𝑃 to 𝐹𝑃 at 𝜏𝑖 for the anomaly detection subsystem
5: ⊲ 𝜇2 (𝜏𝑖 ) : Ratio of 𝑇𝑃 to 𝐹𝑃 at 𝜏𝑖 for the misuse detection subsystem
6:
7: Initiate: 𝜇1 (𝜏0)←INIT , 𝜇2 (𝜏0)←INIT , 𝑡𝑖←𝜏0 , 𝐼 (𝜏0)←1 ⊲ 𝜇1 (𝜏0)=𝑇𝑃1 (𝜏0)/𝐹𝑃1 (𝜏0)
8: ⊲ 𝜇2 (𝜏0)=𝑇𝑃2 (𝜏0)/𝐹𝑃2 (𝜏0)
9: for 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 do
if HALT then
END
else
Check for 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
10:12 if 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 then
13:4 𝜏𝑖 ←𝜏𝑖 + Δ𝜏
15:
16: 𝜇1 (𝜏𝑖 ) ←𝛼𝜇1 (𝜏𝑖 − Δ𝜏) + (1 − 𝛼)𝑇𝑃1 (𝜏𝑖 )−𝑇𝑃1 (𝜏𝑖−Δ𝜏)𝐹𝑃1 (𝜏𝑖 )−𝐹𝑃1 (𝜏𝑖−Δ𝜏)
17:
18: 𝜇2 (𝜏𝑖 ) ←𝛼𝜇2 (𝜏𝑖 − Δ𝜏) + (1 − 𝛼)𝑇𝑃2 (𝜏𝑖 )−𝑇𝑃2 (𝜏𝑖−Δ𝜏)𝐹𝑃2 (𝜏𝑖 )−𝐹𝑃2 (𝜏𝑖−Δ𝜏)
19: else
Go to 𝐻𝐴𝐿𝑇
20:1 if 𝐼 (𝜏𝑖 ) > 𝐼 (𝜏𝑖 − Δ𝜏) then
22:3 𝐷𝑎 (𝜏𝑖 ) ←𝐷𝑎 (𝜏𝑖 − Δ𝜏) + Δ𝐷
24:
25: 𝐷𝑚 (𝜏𝑖 ) ←𝐷𝑚 (𝜏𝑖 − Δ𝜏) − Δ𝐷
26:
27: Go to Initiate
28:
if 𝐼 (𝜏𝑖 ) < 𝐼 (𝜏𝑖 − Δ𝜏) then
29:30 𝐷𝑎 (𝜏𝑖 ) ←𝐷𝑎 (𝜏𝑖 − Δ𝜏) − Δ𝐷
31:
32: 𝐷𝑚 (𝜏𝑖 ) ←𝐷𝑚 (𝜏𝑖 − Δ𝜏) + Δ𝐷
33:
34: Go to Initiate else
Go to Initiate
35:6
37: END
38: end procedure
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which action 𝐴 leads to higher reward 𝑅. In the Q table, the rows represent the states while the
columns represent the actions. In a state (say state 𝑆), the agent takes an action (i.e. action 𝐴),
observes the reward (𝑅) for this action, as well as the next state (𝑆 ′), and re-estimates the Q value.
Equation (11) represents the estimated𝑄 value [41] where 𝑆𝑡 ,𝐴𝑡 and 𝑅𝑡 stand for the state, action
and reward at time 𝑡 , respectively. In addition, 𝛼 and 𝛾 represent the learning rate and a constant
regarding the relative value of rewards, respectively. Indeed, the following conditions hold for both
parameters: 0 < 𝛼 < 1 and 0 < 𝛾 < 1.
𝑄+ (𝑆𝑡 , 𝐴𝑡 ) ← (1 − 𝛼)𝑄+ (𝑆𝑡 , 𝐴𝑡 )+
𝛼 (𝑅𝑡 + 𝛾𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑄+ (𝑆+𝑡 , 𝐴+𝑡 ))
(11)
Equation (12) formulates the estimated function 𝑉 𝜋 (𝑆) which represents the estimation of the
future reward 𝑅 that will be received in the initial state 𝑆 [42]. In the equation 𝜋 (𝑆,𝐴) denotes the
likelihood of action 𝐴 in state 𝑆 , 𝑃𝑆𝑆+ (𝐴) stands for the state transition probability between states 𝑆
and 𝑆+ with action𝐴. 𝑅(𝑆, 𝑆+, 𝐴) is the reward issued after transitioning from state 𝑆 to 𝑆+ at action
𝐴, 𝑟 is the discount factor weight from future rewards to current rewards[42]. The value iteration
used method is shown in Eq.(13) below. Where 𝑉 𝜋 (𝑆) refers to the value estimation of 𝑅 that at
initial state 𝑆 , 𝜋 (𝑆,𝐴) is the probability of 𝐴 in 𝑆 , 𝑃𝑆𝑆+ (𝐴) refers to the transitional probability from
state 𝑆 to 𝑆+ at 𝐴, 𝑅(𝑆, 𝑆+, 𝐴) is the reward returned from transition from state 𝑆 to 𝑆+ at 𝐴, 𝑟 is the
discount factor weight from future rewards to current rewards, 𝑉 𝜋𝐼 (𝑆+) is the value estimation of 𝑅
at state 𝑆+ at the initial iteration 𝐼 , and𝑉 𝜋𝐼+1 (𝑆) is the value estimation of 𝑅 at state 𝑆 at the updated
iteration 𝐼 + 1.
Algorithm 4: Restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM) Procedure
1: procedure RBC-IDS
2: Input:𝑊𝑥𝑦 , 𝑎𝑥 , 𝑏𝑦
3: Output: 𝑃 (𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒), 𝑃 (𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙)
4: Initiate:𝑊𝑥𝑦 , 𝑎𝑥 , 𝑏𝑦 , 𝑋 , 𝑌 .
for 𝑦 = 1, 2, 3, ..., 𝑌 (All hidden layers) do
for 𝑥 = 1, 2, 3, ..., 𝑋 (All visible layers) do
Compute 𝐸 (𝑉 ,𝐻 |Θ) = −∑𝑋𝑥=1 𝑎𝑥𝑉𝑥 −∑𝑌𝑦=1 𝑏𝑦𝐻𝑦 −∑𝑋𝑥=1∑𝑌𝑦=1𝑉𝑥𝐻𝑦𝑊𝑥𝑦
Compute 𝑃 (𝑉 ,𝐻 ) = 𝑒−𝐸 (𝑉 ,𝐻 )∑
𝑋,𝑌 𝑒
−𝐸 (𝑉 ,𝐻 )
5:67
8: Compute 𝑃 (𝑉 ) = ∑𝑌 𝑃 (𝑉 ,𝐻 ) = ∑𝑌 𝑒−𝐸 (𝑉 ,𝐻 )∑
𝑋
∑
𝑌 𝑒
−𝐸 (𝑉 ,𝐻 )
9:
10: Compute 𝑃 (𝐻 ) = ∑𝑋 𝑃 (𝑉 ,𝐻 ) = ∑𝑋 𝑒−𝐸 (𝑉 ,𝐻 )∑
𝑋
∑
𝑌 𝑒
−𝐸 (𝑉 ,𝐻 )
11:
12: Compute 𝑃 (𝑉 |𝐻 ) =∏𝑉𝑥=1 𝑃 (𝑉𝑥 |𝐻 ) Compute 𝑃 (𝐻 |𝑉 ) =∏𝐻𝑦=1 𝑃 (𝐻𝑦 |𝑉 )
13:
14: Compute 𝑃 (𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒) = 𝑃 (𝑂 = 0|𝑉 )
15: Compute 𝑃 (𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙) = 𝑃 (𝑂 = 1|𝑉 )
16: End for
17: End for
18:
19:
20: end procedure
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Fig. 3. RBM used in RBC-IDS which contains one visible layer and 3 hidden layers and one output layer.𝑊11
refers to the weight between the visible layer and the first hidden layer,𝑊12 refers to the weight between the
first and second hidden layers and𝑊23 refers to the weight between the second and third hidden layers. 𝑂1
and 𝑂2 are the 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 and 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 outputs.
𝑉 𝜋 (𝑆) =
∑
𝐴
𝜋 (𝑆,𝐴)
∑
𝑆+
𝑃𝑆𝑆+ (𝐴)𝑅(𝑆, 𝑆+, 𝐴) + 𝑟𝑉 𝜋 (𝑆+) (12)
𝑉 𝜋𝐼+1 (𝑆) =𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐴
∑
𝑃𝑆𝑆+ (𝐴)𝑅(𝑆, 𝑆+, 𝐴) + 𝑟𝑉 𝜋𝐼 (𝑆+) (13)
highest estimation of all possible next actions will be considered while the actual next action is
The equations Eq.(11) and Eq.(14) look almost the same except that in Q-learning the action with 
the next state and action [44]. The previous Q-value function (Eq.(11)) can be updated as in Eq.(14). 
received reward in the next time step for taking action 𝐴 in state 𝑆 , and the reward received from 
updates the policy considering the taken actions. In SARSA, the Q-value function represents the 
SARSA in an on-policy learning algorithm where the agent interrelates with environment and 
represented in the quintuple (𝑆𝑡 , 𝐴𝑡 , 𝑅𝑡 , 𝑆𝑡+1, 𝐴𝑡+1).
reward 𝑅 of action 𝐴, the new state 𝑆 , and the next action 𝐴 for the new state, which can be 
SARSA updates the Q-values depending on current state 𝑆 , the current action 𝐴 for 𝑆 , the returned 
learning algorithm which is considered as a Modified Connectionist Q-Learning (MCQ-L) algorithm. 
5.3.2 State-Action-Reward-State-Action Learning (SARSA). SARSA is an MDP-based reinforcement 
the ability to learn without necessarily following the current policy [43].
is also possible to address stochastic rewards in a non-adaptive manner. In addition, Q-learning has 
learning methods is the model-free nature of Q-learning. Furthermore, by applying Q-learning, it 
  It is worth noting that the reason behind adopting Q-learning as one of our reinforcement 
𝑆+
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considered in SARSA. Looking for the maximum reward in Q-learning can make it more costly
compared to SARSA technique [14].
𝑄 (𝑆𝑡 , 𝐴𝑡 ) ← 𝑄 (𝑆𝑡 , 𝐴𝑡 ) + 𝛼 (𝑅𝑡 + 𝛾𝑄+ (𝑆𝑡+1, 𝐴𝑡+1) −𝑄 (𝑆𝑡 , 𝐴𝑡 )) (14)
5.3.3 Temporal Difference learning (TD) . is a model-free reinforcement learning technique which
can learn by estimating the expected value function by considering approximating distribution
from the current value. The TD technique estimates the state value function under a policy 𝜋 as
shown in Eq.(15) and Eq.(16) bellow.
𝑉 𝜋 (𝑆𝑡 ) = 𝐸𝜋 {
∞∑
𝑡=0
𝛾𝑡𝑅𝑡 } (15)
𝑉 𝜋 (𝑆𝑡 ) = 𝐸𝜋 {𝑅0 + 𝛾𝑉 𝜋 (𝑆1)} (16)
Where 𝑉 𝜋 (𝑆𝑡 ) refers to the state value function with state 𝑆𝑡 , 𝑅 refers to the reward and 𝛾 is the
discount rate under the policy 𝜋 . In Eq.(16), 𝑅0 + 𝛾𝑉 𝜋 (𝑆1) represents the unbiased estimate for
𝑉 𝜋 (𝑆𝑡 ). TD is a technique used to learn how to estimate a value that depends on future values,
which make it useful to learn both the V- function and the Q- function. Whereas, Q-learning is a
specific technique to learn only the Q-function.
Reinforcement learning-based Intrusion Detection System (QL-IDS) for WSNs is illustrated in
Fig. 4. The IDS consists of hierarchically connected clusters with the aggregator and one central
agent its the Agent in the representation of Reinforcement learning Box which tries to model the
state of the monitored network. Following a series of iterations, the central agent knows the action
𝐴 that need to be executed in response to each state 𝑆 in order to obtain a positive reward 𝑅+.
It is worth mentioning that the value iteration works by generating consecutive estimates of the
optimal value function. I n which each of these iterations can be accomplished in 𝑂 ( |𝐴| |𝑆 |2). In
reinforcement learning the required number of iterations can grow exponentially.
C
H
1
C
H
2
C
H
N
RL
(runs) for each scenario with confidence level of 95%. Table 2 presents the simulation inputs.
deployed in four clusters in an area of 100m x 100m. Resulting figures present the mean of 10 tests 
Source Routing protocol specialized for the Hierarchical networks [45]. The tested devices are 
We simulate 20 devices in a network that communicate through H-DSR protocol which is a Dynamic 
6.1 Description of the KDD data-set
6 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Fig. 4. Reinforcement Learning based IDS representation
Safa Otoum and Burak Kantarci and Hussein Mouftah14
Table 2. Testing settings
Simulation Inputs Input Value
Visible elements (inputs) 41
Hidden layers 3
Number of sensors 20
Operational area 100m x 100m
Number of clusters 4
Simulation time 600s
Attack Types DoS,Probe,U2R,R2L
Communication range 100m
𝛼 (The weight of 𝑇𝑃/𝐹𝑃 ) 0.7
𝐼𝑁 𝐼𝑇 0.5
Routing protocol H-DSR
Packet size 250 bytes
Trust range [0,1]
The MIT Lincoln laboratory has collected the data-sets for computer network IDS evaluation
under the support of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research
Laboratory (AFRL). The Knowledge Discovery in Data mining CUP 1999 (KDDCup99) data-set
is a subset of the DARPA data-set [46]. The KDDCup99 is used to test the IDSs efficiency on the
simulated WSN, with each connection record containing 41 features and which are classified as
normal or attack behaviors. The KDDCup99 contains around 311,029 records as test data-set and
494,020 records as training data-set. The numerous attack types in these data-sets are gathered into
attack groups that assign similar attack types within a single group, resulting in an advancement
of the detection rate [46]. KDDCup99 attacks fall under four major groups, specifically, DoS, Probe,
R2L and, U2R, which refer to Denial of Service, probe, Remote to Local and, User to Root attacks
respectively. Table 3 presents examples of the attacks in the KDDCup99 test data-set and KDDCup99
training data-set.
Table 3. KDD data set description [47]
Attack Attacks in test set attacks in training set
Dos processtable, mailbomb neptune, teardrop
R2L named, xsnoop spy, multihop
U2R ps, xterm bufferoverflow, perl
Probe saint, mscan portsweep, ipsweep
dataset, some of the features are represented by string values (i.e protocols names),Numerical
6.2.1 Pre-processing Phase. Since the models performance evaluation are tested using KDD’99 
(4) False Negative (FN): Are the anomalous cases that were incorrectly classified as normal.
(3) True Negative (TN): Are the normal cases that were classified correctly.
(2) False Positive (FP): Are the normal cases that were incorrectly classified as anomalous.
(1) True Positive (TP): Are the anomalous cases that were correctly classified as abnormal.
IDSs are evaluated based on the following criteria’s.
6.2 Performance Evaluation
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Fig. 5. The adopted learning phases
encoding process has been adopted for this matter. The TCP, ICMP and UDP protocols names were
encoded as 001, 010 and 011, respectively.
6.2.2 Training and Testing Phase. The used KDD’99 dataset consists of training and testing datasets.
Each data line of the dataset has 41 features, consist of 38 numerical features and three non-
numerical features. In NS3 we start with training the different models (ex. RBC-IDS training started
with training the first layer, gathering the data generated from the trained layer and using these
data as the training dataset for the second layer and so on).
Fig. 5 represents the adopted common phases between all the proposed learning mechanisms
(ex. machine learning, deep learning and reinforcement learning).
6.2.3 Evaluated Metrics. The following metrics have been considered for evaluating the various
IDSs.
Accuracy Rate (AR): AR denotes the ratio of the truly classified incidences that return to True
Positive (TP) and True Negative (TN) incidences. AR is represented in Eq. (17) [48].
𝐴𝑅 =
𝑇𝑃 +𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 +𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁 (17)
𝐴𝑅 has been presented to trace ASCH-IDS, RBC-IDS, TD-IDS, SARSA-IDS and the QL-IDS ARs
for different scenarios. Fig. 6 shows the 𝐴𝑅 for the ASCH-IDS, RBC-IDS, TD-IDS, SARSA-IDS and
the QL-IDS. The proposed QL-IDS achieves the highest 𝐴𝑅 of 100% followed by SARSA-IDS with
𝐴𝑅 of 99.97% and TD-IDS with 99.94%.
QL-IDS performs with the highest𝐴𝑅 for two reasons: First, Q-Learning is based on the exemplars
from the training data-sets and suited for decision making while the system is running. The agent
interacts with the environment and aims to optimize the cumulative reward (𝑅+) by learning the
best actions through feedback. On the other hand, RBC-IDS makes predictions about data and
learns from training data-sets to build a classifying model.
Detection Rate (DR): DR denotes the behavior that is accurately recognized as intrusive. It
signifies the (𝑇𝑃) as displayed in Eq. (18)[48]. 𝐷𝑅 for ASCH-IDS, RBC-IDS, TD-IDS, SARSA-IDS
and QL-IDS are shown in Fig.(7).
𝐷𝑅 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃 (18)
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Fig. 6. Accuracy rate comparison between QL-IDS,ASCH-IDS, RBC-IDS, TD-IDS and SARSA-IDS.
in the figure, the proposed QL-IDS achieves the highest 𝐷𝑅 followed by SARSA-IDS and TD-IDS.
  Fig. 7 illustrates the 𝐷𝑅𝑠 for ASCH-IDS, RBC-IDS, TD-IDS, SARSA-IDS and QL-IDS. As shown 
Fig. 7. Detection rates comparison between QL-IDS,ASCH-IDS,RBC-IDS, TD-IDS and SARSA-IDS
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Fig. 8. FNR comparison between QL-IDS,ASCH-IDS, RBC-IDS, TD-IDS and SARSA-IDS
False Negative Rate (FNR): FNR defined as the ratio of malicious behavior that have been
designated as non-intrusive[6], as shown in 19 [48].
𝐹𝑁𝑅 =
𝐹𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 +𝑇𝑁 (19)
to ASCH-IDS and RBC-IDS as shown in figure 10. Precision and recall primarily depend on TP
1, results in the best performance [49]. QL-IDS achieves the highest precision-recall ratio compared 
performance can be achieved by the high recall and high precision. Thus, the near precision-recall to 
true positive incidences divided by all actually positive instances as shown in Fig. 10. High system 
expressed as 𝑇 𝑃/(𝑇 𝑃 + 𝐹 𝑃). The recall is formulated as 𝑇 𝑃/(𝑇 𝑃 + 𝐹 𝑁 ), representing the number of 
The precision is the number of true positive incidences divided by all positive incidences, it is 
  𝐹1 Score : 𝐹1 score studies the precision-recall of the test in order to calculate its 𝐹1 score. 
QL-IDS achieves the highest 𝑇 𝑃 , the QL-IDS achieves the best performance in term of ROC.
performs better with the largest area under the curve followed by SARSA-IDS and TD-IDS. Since 
and TD-IDS in order to assess the system performance as shown in Fig. 9. It is clear that the QL-IDS 
reflects the best performance. We plot the ROC curves for ASCH-IDS, QL-IDS, RBC-IDS SARSA-IDS 
  Sensitivity-specificity ratio is represented by the area under the curve where the larger area 
which are (𝑇 𝑃 ) and (𝐹 𝑃 ) respectively.
  (ROC) curve: The ROC curve refers to the ratio between Sensitivity and the (1 − 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖 𝑓 𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦)
reduction which helps in the elimination of redundant features and reduction of the FN cases.
value function to react to all actions and target the positive rewards, RBM is competent at feature 
  This can be interpreted as follows: While QL uses function approximation that represents the 
behind the 𝐷𝑅 and 𝐴𝑅 enhancement.
learning-based RBC-IDS and the ASCH-IDS reacting to the increase of 𝑇 𝑃 which is the reason 
to the case under the other reinforcement learning techniques (SARSA-IDS and TD-IDS), deep 
  In reinforcement learning-based QL-IDS, the overall FNR has been mitigated when compared 
FNR of ASCH-IDS, RBC-IDS, SARSA-IDS, TD-IDS compared to QL-IDS is shown in Fig. 8.
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Fig. 9. ROC curves representation comparison between QL-IDS,ASCH-IDS,RBC-IDS, SARSA-IDS and TD-IDS
!htbp
optimize the cumulative reward (𝑅+).
interacts with the environment tested environment and uses the feedback to choose the actions to 
exemplars from the training data-sets and suited for on-the-fly decision making while the agent 
performance. QL-IDS performs with the highest 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 since Q-learning is based on the 
Fig. 10. Precision-Recall representation of QL-IDS, ASCH-IDS, RBC-IDS, SARSA-IDS and TD-IDS
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Fig. 11. 𝐹1 Score representation of QL-IDS, ASCH-IDS, RBC-IDS, SARSA-IDS and TD-IDS
𝐹1 denotes the harmonic average of precision and recall, 𝐹1-score is formulated as in eq. (20),
and 𝐹1-score performance of the IDS solutions for the WSNs under investigation are plotted in Fig.
11 [50] .
𝐹1 = 2 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 (20)
≈ 100% detection rate and ≈ 100% accuracy rate in the existence of intrusive behavior in the tested
reinforcement learning solutions. Through simulations, we have verified that QL-IDS works with 
and Clustered IDS (RBC-IDS), Q-Learning-based IDS (QL-IDS), SARSA-IDS and TD-IDS, which are 
Supervised and Clustered Hybrid IDS (ASCH-IDS) with a Restricted Boltzmann Machine-based 
WSNs. We specifically investigate our previously proposed machine learning-based Adaptively 
learning based IDS systems with deep learning based IDS for critical infrastructure monitoring 
Wireless networks is a must. In this study, we present a comparative study between machine 
leads to huge vulnerabilities. Therefore, the robustness of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) in 
Networks are deployed in open and uncontrolled environments, transmitting data through them 
behaviors are fundamental functions to ensure security of the monitoring operation. Since Wireless 
one of the vital issues in smart cities. Monitoring the networks components and detecting malicious 
resources especially for the critical infrastructures. Critical infrastructure security is considered as 
Volunteer computing uses Internet-connected devices make it easy for participants to share their 
7 CONCLUSION
QL-IDS introduces improved 𝐹1 score compared to SARSA-IDS, TD-IDS, ASCH-IDS and RBC-IDS.
precision and recall. Thus, the better the precision-recall the better the 𝐹1 score. Figure 11 shows that 
to calculate its 𝐹1 score. 𝐹1 score is a reliable metric to use if the test cases seek balance between 
  The 𝐹1 score measures test accuracy [50] by studying the precision-recall of the test in order 
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